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INTRODUCTION 
 
Inspector Harry Callahan is not pleased with the Supreme Court.
1
 
The fictional San Francisco homicide detective, famously portrayed by 
Clint Eastwood in the film Dirty Harry, has just captured a sadistic 
serial killer known as Scorpio.
2
 There is just one problem: Scorpio’s 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
3
 rights were violated 
when Callahan kicked in his door and searched his home without a 
warrant, denied him medical treatment, and tortured him in order to 
elicit a confession.
4
 Also, because Callahan failed to read Scorpio the 
Miranda warnings, crucial evidence discovered subsequent to the 
confession would have to be suppressed.
5
 When told that the charges 
have been dropped because Scorpio’s constitutional rights were 
                                                 
* J.D candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law; University of 
Illinois at Chicago, M.B.A., May 2010; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
B.S., Psychology, May 2001. 
1
 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971). 
2
 Id. 
3
 U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI & XIV. 
4
 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971). 
5
 Id. 
1
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violated, Callahan growls: “Well I’m all broke up about that man’s 
rights.”
6
 Callahan then weighs in on the exclusionary rule: “Well then, 
the law is crazy.”
7
 
It is, of course, preposterous (although admittedly entertaining) 
that a seasoned homicide detective would be so ignorant of Supreme 
Court criminal procedure jurisprudence that the serial killer is to go 
free because the inspector has blundered.
8
 However, in the decades 
following the release of Dirty Harry, police departments in the United 
States were encouraging their officers not to brazenly flout the 
mandates of the Supreme Court like Inspector Callahan, but to craft 
techniques to circumvent the protections that the Court had bestowed 
on suspects in criminal investigations.
9
 One such technique was the 
two-step interrogation.
10
 
The two-step interrogation was most recently presented to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States 
v. Johnson.
11
 In Johnson, the defendant appealed, inter alia, the 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin’s denial of a 
motion to suppress his post-arrest statements.
12
 The defendant sought 
the suppression of the statements based on the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Missouri v. Seibert.
13
 Seibert directly addressed the 
                                                 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J., famously 
stating: “The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”). 
9
 See generally Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: 
Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999). 
10
 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 328–29 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Arthur S. Aubry & Rudolph R. Caputo, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 290 (3d 
ed. 1980)) (“Standard interrogation manuals advise that ‘[t]he securing of the first 
admission is the biggest stumbling block.’ If this first admission can be obtained, 
‘there is every reason to expect that the first admission will lead to others, and 
eventually to the full confession.’”). 
11
 680 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2012). 
12
 Id. at 978. See United States v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D.Wis. 2005). 
13
 542 U.S. 600 (2004); Johnson, 680 F.3d at 978–79. 
2
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 8, Issue 1                              Fall 2012 
 
101 
 
two-step interrogation technique, where investigators would withhold 
Miranda warnings during custodial questioning until a confession was 
obtained.
14
 After confessing, the suspect would be advised of their 
Miranda rights and investigators would proceed to elicit an identical 
(and now admissible) statement.
15
  
Seibert was a deeply divided plurality opinion that produced two 
potential tests for evaluating the admissibility of two-step 
interrogations.
16
 Justice Souter wrote for a four-Justice plurality, 
announcing a multi-factor test to determine whether Miranda warnings 
“delivered midstream could be effective.”
17
 Justice Kennedy, 
concurring only in the judgment of the Court, wrote separately, 
arguing for an intent-based test that examined whether law 
enforcement used the procedure deliberately.
18
 
In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant was not 
entitled to relief under Seibert, stating as dictum: “We have yet to 
determine which [Seibert] test governs in this circuit.”
19
 This is an 
understatement. The Seventh Circuit has struggled to consistently 
apply one Seibert test over another, frustrating any lower court’s 
search for viable binding precedent. This Note will summarize the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Miranda and Seibert, examine the 
Seventh Circuit’s inconsistent application of Seibert, and advocate for 
the abandonment of the intent-based test espoused by Justice Kennedy 
in his concurring opinion in Seibert.
20
 
 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 604; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
15
 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 615. 
18
 Id. at 618–22 
19
 Johnson, 680 F.3d at 978–79. 
20
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Seibert, 542 U.S. 600. 
3
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I. MIRANDA 
 
In 1966, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Miranda 
v. Arizona.
21
 Miranda held that statements made by a suspect as a 
result of custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless law 
enforcement first warns the suspect of certain constitutional rights.
22
 
Specifically, the suspect must be “clearly informed” that: (1) he has 
the right to remain silent; (2) anything he says can and will be used 
against him in court; (3) he has the right to consult with an attorney 
before the interrogation and to have an attorney present during 
interrogation; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
appointed to represent him.
23
 Miranda did not mandate that the 
warnings must be given exactly as written in the opinion, but law 
enforcement must follow “procedures which are at least as effective in 
apprising accused persons of their right[s].”
24
 
In order for a suspect’s statement to be introduced in court, the 
prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Miranda rights were waived.
25
 A waiver is valid only when the suspect 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquishes his rights.
26
 To 
assess the validity of a waiver, courts must consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation;
27
 relevant factors include 
the suspect’s age, physical and mental condition, intelligence and 
education, and familiarity with the criminal justice system.
28
 
 
                                                 
21
 384 U.S. 436. 
22
 Id. at 467–73. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at 467. 
25
 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). 
26
 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
27
 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
28
 See e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) 
4
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II. SEIBERT 
 
In Missouri v. Seibert the Court held that the “two-step” 
interrogation technique undermines the effectiveness of the Miranda 
warnings and thus invalidates a suspect’s waiver.
29
 The Court noted 
that technique of “interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned 
phases raises a new challenge to Miranda.”
30
  
 
A. The Facts 
 
Patrice Seibert’s twelve year-old son Jonathan, who suffered from 
cerebral palsy, died in his sleep.
31
 Fearing she would be charged with 
neglect, Seibert, along with two of her sons (and some of their 
friends), schemed to burn down the family’s trailer home with 
Jonathan’s body inside.
32
 To dispel any suspicion that Jonathan had 
been left unsupervised, the plan also included allowing Donald Rector, 
a mentally ill teenager living with the family, to perish in the fire.
33
  
Seibert was arrested five days after the fire was set, at the hospital 
bedside of one of her sons, who was severely burned during the 
commission of the arson.
34
 Prior to the arrest, Officer Richard 
Hanrahan of the Rolla, Missouri police department, instructed the 
arresting officer to not read Seibert the Miranda warnings.
35
 At the 
police station, Seibert was left alone in an interrogation room for 
fifteen to twenty minutes.
36
 Without reading Seibert the Miranda 
warnings, Hanrahan interrogated her for thirty to forty minutes, during 
which time Seibert confessed that she knew that Rector’s death was 
                                                 
29
 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
30
 Id. at 609. 
31
 Id. at 604.  
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. 
5
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part of the arson plot.
37
 After a fifteen to twenty minute break, 
Hanrahan advised Seibert of the Miranda warnings, activated an audio 
recorder, and asked her to repeat her confession.
38
  
At times during the second interrogation, Hanrahan confronted 
Seibert with specific admissions she had made during the initial 
interrogation, pressuring her to admit that she knew there “was [an] 
understanding about Donald [Rector].”
39
 Referring to the initial 
interrogation, Hanrahan asked Seibert: “ ‘Trice, didn’t you tell me that 
[Rector] was supposed to die in his sleep?”
40
 Ultimately, Seibert’s 
warned (i.e., post-Miranda) statement, subsequent to a detailed thirty 
to forty minute unwarned interrogation, resulted in Seibert being 
charged with first-degree murder.
41
 
 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
 
Before trial in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Seibert sought 
the suppression of both statements.
42
 The trial court suppressed the 
initial statement but admitted the statement made after the Miranda 
recitation.
43
 Seibert was convicted of second-degree murder.
44
 
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the two-step 
interrogation was indistinguishable from Oregon v. Elstad, in which a 
suspect was inadvertently not read Miranda warnings during a brief 
initial questioning.
45
 Elstad held that “[a] subsequent administration of 
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but 
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 605. 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 606. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id.; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985). 
6
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that precluded admission of the earlier statement.”
46
 Thus, there is no 
presumption of coercive effect where the suspect’s initial statement 
was voluntary.
47
 Elstad directed courts to examine the totality of the 
circumstances in evaluating the voluntariness of the post-warning 
statement.
48
 The Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s 
decision, finding that Seibert’s second statement was voluntary per 
Elstad.
49
 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that both of 
Seibert’s statements should have been excluded because Hanrahan’s 
initial interrogation was lengthy and detailed, and the specific 
admissions of Seibert’s initial statement were exploited by Hanrahan 
in the second interrogation as he urged her to repeat her confession.
50
 
The court distinguished Elstad, in that Hanrahan had deliberately 
withheld advising Seibert of her Miranda warnings as opposed to an 
unintentional violation.
51
 
The State of Missouri petitioned the United States Supreme Court; 
certiorari was granted to answer the question of whether a deliberate 
withholding of Miranda warnings mandates the suppression of post-
warning statements.
52
 
 
C. The Plurality Opinion 
 
Seibert’s conviction was reversed and remanded in a five to four 
plurality decision.
53
 The plurality, Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg 
and Breyer, held that the two-step interrogation tactic employed by 
Hanrahan required the suppression of Seibert’s second statement, 
                                                 
46
 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314. 
47
 Id. at 318. 
48
 Id. 
49
 State of Missouri v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804 at *8–9 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002) (unpublished).  
50
 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 606. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. at 607. 
53
 Id. 
7
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finding that “the object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings 
ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, 
after the suspect has already confessed.”
54
 The Court noted that the 
reason for the technique’s nationwide popularity was obvious: “to get 
a confession the suspect would not make if he understood his rights at 
the outset.”
55
 The Court reasoned that “[u]pon hearing warnings only 
in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a 
suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let 
alone persist in so believing once the police began to lead him over the 
same ground again.”
56
 For the plurality, the threshold issue was 
whether in these types of circumstances the warnings could function 
“effectively” as Miranda requires.
57
 
The plurality found five factors determinative as to whether 
“warnings delivered midstream” could be effective: (1) “the 
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round 
of interrogation;” (2) “the overlapping content of the two statements;” 
(3) “the timing and setting of the first and the second [interrogations];” 
(4) “the continuity of police personnel;” and (5) “the degree to which 
the interrogator’s questions treated the second [interrogation] as 
continuous with the first.”
58
  
Applying these factors to the facts of Seibert’s case, the Court 
found relevant that the unwarned interrogation took place at the police 
station; that the questioning was “systematic, exhaustive, and managed 
with psychological skill;” and that the two interrogations were 
separated by only 15 to 20 minutes and conducted in the same 
location.
59
 Particularly bothersome to the plurality was that “[n]othing 
was said or done to dispel the oddity of warning about legal rights to 
silence and counsel right after the police had led [Seibert] through a 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 611. 
55
 Id. at 613. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. at 611–12. 
58
 Id. at 615. 
59
 Id. at 616. 
8
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systematic interrogation.”
60
 The result, the Court concluded, was that 
“a reasonable person in the [Seibert’s] shoes would not have 
understood [the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that she 
retained a choice about continuing to talk.”
61
 
 
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
 
Justice Kennedy joined in the judgment, but wrote a separate 
concurring opinion, believing that the plurality’s objective inquiry 
from the perspective of the suspect, which would apply in the both 
intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations, was too 
broad.
62
 Justice Kennedy advocated a narrower test applicable only 
when “the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated 
way to undermine the Miranda warning.”
63
 Justice Kennedy described 
circumstances in which unintentional two-step interrogations may 
occur:  
 
An officer may not realize that a suspect is in custody and 
warnings are required. The officer may not plan to question 
the suspect or may be waiting for a more appropriate time. 
Skilled investigators often interview suspects multiple times, 
and good police work may involve referring to prior 
statements to test their veracity or to refresh recollection.
64
  
 
Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, unless a court finds that the 
procedure was deliberate, Elstad controls, requiring an inquiry only 
into whether the statements were made voluntarily and without 
coercion.
65
 
                                                 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at 617. 
62
 Id. at 621–22. 
63
 Id. at 622. 
64
 Id. at 620. 
65
 Id. at 622. 
9
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Justice Kennedy’s test, with its deliberateness requirement, also 
provided that “postwarning statements that are related to the substance 
of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures 
are taken before the postwarning statement is made.”
66
 Curative 
measures are measures “designed to ensure that a reasonable person in 
the suspect's situation would understand the import and effect of the 
Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver,” such as “a substantial 
break in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement 
and the Miranda warning” or “an additional warning that explains the 
likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement.”
67
 While 
two tests emerged from Seibert, the facts of the case mandated 
suppression of the second statement under both standards. 
 
III. SEIBERT’S PROGENY IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
A. Stewart I, II, and III 
 
On November 9, 2004, the Seventh Circuit decided United States 
v. Stewart.
68
 The defendant, Timothy Stewart appealed his conviction 
for armed bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of 
violence, contending that the admission of his confession at trial 
violated Seibert.
69
 Stewart was detained after police established a 
checkpoint near the recently-robbed bank, because he matched the 
description of the suspect and because he could not provide a plausible 
explanation of where he was going or where he had been during the 
time of the robbery.
70
 Stewart voluntarily got into the car of two 
Evansville, Indiana police detectives and asked them to “drive” and to 
                                                 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2004) (Stewart I). 
69
 Id. at 1081. 
70
 Id. at 1082. 
10
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“take [him] downtown.”
71
 When one of the detectives asked him why, 
Stewart responded: “Well, you're going to arrest me anyway.”
72
 
While being transported to the police station, the detectives 
questioned Stewart for approximately five minutes.
73
 At the police 
station, the questioning continued for twenty minutes, with two FBI 
agents participating in the interrogation; Stewart subsequently 
confessed to committing the robbery.
74
 At this point, one of the 
detectives read Stewart the Miranda warnings; Stewart signed a 
waiver, answered questions for another hour, and made a tape-
recorded confession.
75
 The confession was admitted at trial and 
Stewart was convicted.
76
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded:  
 
On the record before us . . . we cannot determine whether the 
admission of Stewart's confession was improper under 
Seibert, or, if not improper under Seibert, whether the initial 
unwarned confession would flunk the voluntariness standard 
of Elstad . . . More specifically, the record does not speak to 
whether the two-step interrogation in this case was 
deliberately used in circumvention of Miranda. If it was, then 
the analysis of the Seibert plurality and Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence merge, requiring an inquiry into the sufficiency 
of the break in time and circumstances between the unwarned 
and warned confessions.
77
  
 
                                                 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at 1083. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at 1091. 
11
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Remanding the case for further evidentiary findings, the court 
indicated it would apply a hybrid of the two tests established in 
Seibert.
78
 
On remand, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana 
held an evidentiary hearing and found that Stewart's interrogation was 
not an “end run” around Miranda.
79
 The court stated: “There is no 
evidence that the [Evansville Police Department] has ever had a policy 
which employs the two-step interrogation technique, nor evidence that 
the EPD has ever trained or instructed their officers to employ such a 
technique.”
80
 Stewart again appealed.
81
  
In Stewart II, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court's 
analysis was improperly narrowed to whether the Evansville Police 
Department had an official policy encouraging two-step interrogation 
or provided training instructing officers to use the technique.
82
 The 
court found that “[t]hese considerations are potentially relevant to the 
broader question of officer intent but by themselves are by no means 
dispositive of the issue.”
83
 
Because the district court’s decision did not make factual findings 
necessary to determine whether the two-step interrogation was 
calculated, the court again remanded the case, with instructions for the 
district court to make more specific findings regarding whether “the 
officers intentionally withheld Miranda warnings as part of a 
deliberate strategy to elicit inculpatory statements in circumvention of 
Miranda.”
84 
 
The district court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, ruling that the two-step procedure was not a 
deliberate “end run” around Miranda, because the lead investigator did 
                                                 
78
 Id. at 1092. 
79
 United States v. Stewart, 191 F. Appx 495, 496 (7th Cir. 2006) (Stewart II). 
80
 Id. at 498. 
81
 Id.  
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
12
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not believe Stewart was in custody because Stewart requested to enter 
the detectives’ car and demanded to be driven to the police station.
85
  
The Seventh Circuit, in Stewart III, affirmed the judgment of the 
district court, holding that “[t]he question of whether the interrogating 
officer deliberately withheld Miranda warnings will invariably turn on 
the credibility of the officer's testimony in light of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This is a factual finding 
entitled to deference on appeal.”
86
 The court added: (1) that “the 
government bears the burden of proving the police did not deliberately 
withhold the warnings until after they had an initial inculpatory 
statement in hand”; (2) that delayed Miranda warnings do not always 
“give rise to an inference of deliberateness”; and (3) that “the lack of 
overlap between the warned and unwarned statements is evidence that 
the interrogator did not deliberately use a two-step strategy designed to 
circumvent Miranda.”
87
 
The Seventh Circuit’s analyses in the Stewart cases invoke a 
hybrid of the Seibert plurality’s factor-based test and Justice 
Kennedy’s deliberateness requirement.
88
 Stewart provides that, when 
the tactic is intentional, the second statement in a two-step 
interrogation should be presumptively excluded.
89
 However, this 
presumption can be overcome by a showing that the Miranda 
warnings were “effective;” a showing that can be made by applying 
the plurality’s factor-based test.
90
 However, “[w]here the initial 
                                                 
85
 United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2008) (Stewart III). 
86
 Id. at 719–20. 
87
 Id. at 719–22. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
6.8(b) n.49 (West 3d ed. 2012). 
88
 See United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir.2004); United States v. 
Stewart, 191 F. Appx 495 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
89
 United States v. Stewart, 536 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2008). See Eric English, 
Note, You Have the Right to Remain Silent. Now Please Repeat Your Confession: 
Missouri v. Seibert and the Court's Attempt to Put an End to the Question-First 
Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 423, 462–63 (2006). 
90
 Id. 
13
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violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to 
undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.”
91
 
 
B. Heron 
 
Less than one year after Stewart III was decided, the Seventh 
Circuit was again confronted with a two-step interrogation in U.S. v. 
Heron.
92
 In Heron, the district court admitted the defendant’s second 
statement, using Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test.
93
 The Seventh 
Circuit held that the statement was admissible under either test, stating 
that there was “no need here to resolve once and for all what rule or 
rules governing two-step interrogations can be distilled from 
Seibert.”
94
 However, announcing a departure from the Stewart hybrid 
test, the Heron court invoked the Marks standard regarding plurality 
decisions.
95
 The Marks standard provides that “[w]hen a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”
96
 The Heron court concluded 
that when a concurrence that provides the vote necessary to reach a 
majority does not provide a “common denominator” for the judgment, 
the Marks rule is inapplicable.
97
 Since only Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence could possibly be read to support Justice Kennedy’s test, 
“[the intent-based test] is obviously not the ‘common denominator’ 
that Marks was talking about.”
98
  
                                                 
91
 United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir.2004). 
92
 564 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2009). 
93
 Id. at 883–84. 
94
 Id. at 885. 
95
 Id. at 883–85. 
96
 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
97
 Heron, 564 F.3d at 884. 
98
 Id. at 885. 
14
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The Heron court conceded that a “defendant-focused” effects test 
“may be in some tension with our decision in Stewart,” and also 
characterized the court’s holding in Stewart I as mere “tentative 
statements.”
99
 The court stated that “nothing in the Seibert plurality 
opinion condemns us to a mechanical counting of items on a list. We 
must instead examine each one of them for the light it throws on the 
central inquiry: whether the later Miranda warnings were effective.”
100
 
The court in Heron therefore clearly indicated (albeit in dicta) its 
preference for the effects test and forecasted a potential abandonment 
of both the hybrid and intent-based test.
101
 
 
C. Other Seventh Circuit Decisions 
 
Subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions reveal that the issue is far 
from resolved. In United States v. Dixie, the court (citing Stewart I) 
stated “we have previously explained that Justice Kennedy's separate 
concurrence represents the narrowest ground of the decision”;
102
 in 
United States v. Lee, the court cited Heron: “[T]his Court has yet to 
choose which test should govern”;
103
 in United States v. Littledale, 
citing Stewart III: “There can be no finding of an improper two-step 
interrogation . . . unless the officers deliberately withheld Miranda 
warnings until after the suspect confessed”;
104
 in United States v. 
Vallar: “We have construed Seibert as holding ‘that post-warning 
statements are inadmissible if they duplicate pre-warning statements 
intentionally elicited in an effort to evade Miranda ”;
105
 and, most 
                                                 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. at 887 (emphasis added). 
101
 See id. 
102
 382 F. App’x 517, 520 (7th Cir. 2010). 
103
 618 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir.2010) (applying both the tests of the plurality 
opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Seibert, without determining which is 
controlling). 
104
 652 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2011). 
105
 635 F.3d 271, 285–86 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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recently, in Johnson: “We have yet to determine which [Seibert] test 
governs in this circuit.”
106
  
 
IV. THE INTENT-BASED TEST SHOULD BE ABANDONED 
 
While seven circuit courts have expressly chosen the intent-based 
test;
107
 other circuits have properly noted the difficulties in 
determining the proper test arising from Seibert.
108
 The intent-based 
test should be abandoned by the Seventh Circuit, because (1) the 
Marks rule regarding plurality decisions does not mandate courts to 
adopt the intent-based test; (2) the intent-based test is contrary to 
precedent because subjective intent has never before been relevant for 
purposes of Miranda and criminal procedure in general; and (3) the 
intent-based test furthers the harmful erosion of Miranda’s protections. 
 
A. The Marks Rule Regarding Plurality Decisions is Inapplicable 
 
The Marks rule holds that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’”
109
 However, in practice, the Marks rule has 
                                                 
106
 United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966, 978–79 (7th Cir. 2012). 
107
 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 
1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Briones, 390 
F.3d 610, 613–14 (8th Cir. 2004).  
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 608 F.3d 100, 103–04 (1st Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Pacheco–Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 427 n. 11 (6th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Carrizales–Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). 
109
 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). 
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significant limitations.
110
 The Supreme Court has noted that “[w]e 
think it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical 
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower 
courts that have considered it.”
111
 
In Seibert, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence states that the relevant 
inquiry is subjective deliberateness on the part of law enforcement, not 
the objective effectiveness factors of the plurality opinion.
112
 However, 
three of the four Justices in the plurality and the four dissenting 
Justices expressly rejected consideration of the interrogator’s intent.
113
 
Writing for the dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, stated: 
 
[T]he plurality correctly declines to focus its analysis on the 
subjective intent of the interrogating officer. . . . The plurality's  
rejection of an intent-based test is . . . correct . . . [b]ecause  
voluntariness is a matter of the suspect's state of mind [and]. . .  
[t]houghts kept inside a police officer's head cannot affect that 
experience. . . . [F]ocusing constitutional analysis on a police  
officer's subjective intent [is] an unattractive proposition that we  
all but uniformly avoid.
114
  
 
This demonstrates that, although Justice Kennedy cast the fifth and 
deciding vote for the judgment of the Court, his concurring opinion is 
not the narrowest holding supported by a majority of the Court as 
required by Marks.
115
 As a dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, “all but one of the central points of Seibert enjoys the 
                                                 
110
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (stating that the Marks 
rule is “more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the 
result”). 
111
 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994). 
112
 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
113
 Id. 
114
 Id. at 623–626. 
115
 See id.; Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
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support of five Justices: The rejection of subjective intent enjoys the 
assent of at least seven Justices.”
116
 
Because the Marks rule is not dispositive as to which Seibert 
opinion is controlling, courts are not bound to adopt or even 
incorporate Justice Kennedy’s intent-based test when analyzing two-
step interrogations.  
 
B. The Intent-Based Test is Contrary to Precedent 
 
While Justices O’Connor, Stevens, and Thomas dissented in 
judgment from the plurality, Justice O’Connor’s opinion stands boldly, 
alongside three members of the plurality, for a rejection of the intent-
based test proposed by Justice Kennedy.
117
 In Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion, the intent-based test is contrary to the Fifth Amendment in 
that the “[f]reedom from compulsion [that] lies at the heart of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . requires us to assess whether a suspect’s decision to 
speak truly was voluntary.”
118
 Additionally, according to Justice 
O'Connor, the Court has unequivocally “reject[ed] an intent-based test 
in several criminal procedure contexts,”
119
 such as New York v. 
Quarles,
120
 and Whren v. United States.
121
 An examination of these and 
other cases makes clear that the subjective intent of law enforcement 
should never be a relevant inquiry. 
Quarles carved out an exception to Miranda that allowed law 
enforcement to question a suspect without providing Miranda 
warnings when public safety is a concern; responses to the questioning 
are admissible at the suspect's trial.
122
 The Court believed that “police 
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between 
                                                 
116
 United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1141 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Berzon, J., dissenting). 
117
 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622–628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
118
 Id. at 624. 
119
 Id. at 626. 
120
 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). 
121
 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996). 
122
 Quarles, 467 U.S. 649. 
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questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the 
public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence 
from a suspect.”
123
 The Court made clear that the application of the 
public safety exception to Miranda “should not be made to depend on 
post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective 
motivation of the arresting officer.”
124
 
Whren held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
pretextual traffic stops.
125
 Prior to Whren, some courts used a test that 
focused solely on the motivation of the law enforcement official for 
initiating the traffic stop;
126
 however, subjective motivation—often 
criticized for its difficulty in administration—was contrary to prior 
decisions holding that reasonableness per the Fourth Amendment was 
not a subjective inquiry.
127
 The Whren court definitively stated that 
“[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”
128
 
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court affirmed the application of 
Miranda to driving under the influence cases.
129
 The Court held, with 
regard to Miranda, “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing 
on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular 
time;” rather, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the 
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”
130
 
Moran v. Burbine held that pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, law enforcement has no obligation to inform a suspect 
who has not requested an attorney that one is present and wishes to 
                                                 
123
 Id. at 658–59. 
124
 Id. at 656. 
125
 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–14 . 
126
 See Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the 
“Would Have” Test Work?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917 (2008). 
127
 Id. at 813–15. 
128
 Id. at 813. 
129
 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
130
 Id. at 421–22. See also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323–324 
(1994) (A custody determination “depends on the objective circumstances of the 
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating 
officers or the person being questioned.”). 
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speak to the suspect.
131
 The Court held that, “whether intentional or 
inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question 
of the intelligence and voluntariness of respondent’s election to 
abandon his [Miranda] rights.”
132
 
In Beckwith v. United States, the Court held that Miranda 
warnings were not required to be given to a suspect who made 
incriminating statements to IRS agents during non-custodial 
questioning at the suspect’s home.
133
 The Court stated that the agents’ 
subjective belief that the suspect was the focus of a criminal 
investigation was irrelevant in determining whether the questioning 
was custodial.
134
 
Even in United States v. Leon, a case that, according to one 
commentator, “likely reflects the Supreme Court’s greatest deference 
to police officer intent,”
135
 the Court demanded an objective 
standard—the officer's reasonable reliance—to excuse acting on a 
warrant that was later invalidated.
136
 
More recently in Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court reinforced its 
preference for objectivity regarding Miranda, stating plainly: “The 
Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test . . . The objective test 
furthers ‘the clarity of [Miranda’s] rule’”
137
  
The above cases make clear that the subjective intentions of law 
enforcement should not be a relevant inquiry in determining whether 
statements elicited during two-step interrogations should be 
admissible. 
 
                                                 
131
 475 U.S. 412, 423–26 (1986). 
132
 Id. at 423. 
133
 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
134
 Id. at 346–47. 
135
 Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. 
Seibert Police "Bad Faith" Test is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 416 (2005). 
136
 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
137
 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)). 
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C. The Intent-Based Test Erodes Miranda’s Protections 
 
The intent-based test erodes the protections of Miranda by 
creating a hopeless situation where defendants must convince courts 
that specific police officers acted in bad faith by initially withholding 
the Miranda warnings. This allegation can be easily rebutted by the 
officer’s testimony that the conduct was inadvertent. Situations are 
common where the status of the individual as witness or suspect is 
unclear at the time of interrogation, or where the custodial status of the 
individual is murky. These circumstances allow an officer to color his 
conduct as unintentional and place an undue burden on the defendant 
to prove otherwise. This incorrectly diverts the analysis from what is 
most fundamental to the Miranda warnings: Whether a reasonable 
person in the suspect's shoes would have meaningfully understood the 
warnings to convey the message that they retained a real choice about 
continuing to speak.
138
 The objective criteria of the plurality’s factor 
based test in Seibert furthers this objective by requiring circumstances 
be such that the individual can truly reflect on their decision to invoke 
their constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel present 
during questioning. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because the intent-based test is not controlling, is contrary to 
precedent, and diminishes the protections endowed upon suspects in 
criminal investigations by the Miranda decision, the Seventh Circuit 
should take the next opportunity to abandon this test.  
                                                 
138
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966). 
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